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Buzgalin A.V.

 

Ukraine – West - Russia:

multidimensionality of contradictions, definiteness of position

(version 08-14; Moscow – Crimea)

 

I want to mention: first of all, my thoughts are a "provocation" to a dialogue. Secondly, they are being written for four months already, being supplemented with new materials, as the situation in the triangle outlined in the title is developing rapidly. Below the reader is offered a version completed 18 August 2014. Thirdly, analysis of the situation in Ukraine is important to use the system dialectical approach. It sounds as obviously, as corny, for a marxist but this approach is rarely used. That is why it is even more important to apply it to the analysis of such a complex subject as the confrontation in Ukraine.

 

1. Pre-history and political and economic basis of confrontation.

 

Let us emphasize: we analyze this situation in the context of social space and historical context. We do not put the question in this way: who is right, who is wrong, Russia or the West, Ukraine's new government or someone else, and it is not clear who this «someone» is. The question is put a little differently: "What are social-spatial and historical contradictions that gave rise to the current situation in Ukraine?"

Let us look at the problem through the prism of the history of those social-spatial parameters, in which Ukraine is today with all its complex of territories, some of which are traditionally Ukrainian, some - traditionally Russian, others changed their patrons many times over the past centuries.

Ukraine has gone through a change of [des]integrations several times over the past centuries. It concerned interaction with Poland, with Russia; it concerned series of internal conflicts and wars on the territory of Ukraine during the last centuries, starting from what happened after ruling of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, in Poltava, through the situation of civil war in the late 1917-1922. The history of the last period is particularly instructive. Part of Ukrainian nationalists fought together with Germany and Austria-Hungary, part – against them; Pro-Russian part of the population has teamed up with red, with white in the struggle for united Russia; some resisted both white and red in the struggle for independence of Ukraine. The second World war (for us - the Great Patriotic war) also passed through the territory of Ukraine and separated out there two groups of people besides those who were only victims of this terrible war. The majority of Ukrainians together with the Red Army fought against fascism in all its manifestations, absolute (but significant) minority joined detachments of Bandera and various nationalist formations, used as guards by the German fascists. In fact they were accomplices of the Nazis, sometimes even more terrible than their hosts, although it all happened under the flag of the national liberation of Ukraine (it is well known that fascism was widely used in the nationalist movement, and Ukraine is no exception: the Vlasov’s army was also "Russian liberation army", it was also attended by nationalist slogans, although, of course, in both cases, these formations were the puppet and purely reactionary).

This context is important because it again emerged today, after more than half a century. While 30 years ago in Ukraine a conversation about Bandera and OUN, etc. in a positive sense was impossible at all, including supporters of «perestroika» in Gorbachev’s period, now they became a symbol of national liberation for a large part of Ukrainians.

The second important component of the historical process – is a well-known transfer of Crimea to Ukraine. While the Soviet Union existed, belonging of the Crimea to the Ukrainian Republic was largely symbolic, however, since 1992, after the Belovezh deal, Ukrainian status of Crimea has become a considerable problem.

Generally, since 1992, the "Russian question" has become more than relevant in Ukraine, where there was a marked division not only by the socio-economic and political characteristics, but also by national and ethno-cultural orientations. And here the language and cultural space proved to be significant, and "diffuse" as well. The Russian space on Ukraine was still Ukrainian, now people speak a specific Russian language there, and in some cases – use their own dialect (e.g. in Odessa), in some cases people use the southern dialect, which is "a bit" of Ukrainian and penetrated into the territory of Russia a long time ago.

The same applies to Western Ukraine, in a part of which the population is already drawing more to the Central and Eastern European cultural layers, rather than to the Ukrainian cultural heritage, that is becoming a sign of provincialism, from which some people want to get rid of (but it is not so easy...). That is the diffusion. There is a diffusion in "the middle" as well, because Gogol, Shevchenko and many other great art workers belong simultaneously to both Ukraine and Russia; both Ukrainian nationalists and Russian-oriented part of Ukraine are simultaneously proud of them. This unity is especially true for the Soviet Ukrainian culture: if you mention the great film director Dovzhenko, singer Hnatiuk, or creators of a grand aircraft "Antey", astronauts or other heroes, including heroes of the Great Patriotic war, every Ukrainian and Russian will consider them as their own own.

This context is important. The contradiction East-West in Ukraine is not only the two poles separated from each other by the national barrier with the traditions of the confrontation but merely a diffuse spaces, with a strong tradition of unity, where the history of the struggle is not too deep, except the cases when either Ukrainian nationalists with fascist roots, or Russian chauvinists are at the edge of the opposition.

Another historically important fact – is a "shock therapy" (or rather, the policy of "shock without therapy"), which swept through both Ukraine and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. One of the results of these "reforms" - "appropriation-privatization", i.e. the concentration within a very short period of time in the hands of a few oligarchs huge national wealth, especially natural resources and large production facilities that manufacture products after processing of raw materials (metals etc). It happened almost the same way in Russia and in Ukraine, both on its East and its West. The result was the bureaucratic-oligarchic capitalism, corresponding by key parameters to the Russian one, and it was formed Ukraine throughout the 1990s, the same way as in Russia - by in/e-volution stages. The difference consisted in the fact that there was no Putin in Ukraine, instead there appeared parody clones Gorbachev. The Central government, therefore, was rather weak and indecisive. The struggle of the oligarchic clans very actively used these contradictions in the field of socio-cultural space and nationalism of all kinds. Hence the significant socio-economic "embeddedness" of the conflict, which at first sight look like a purely ethnic, cultural.

The result of endless and is not completed till the end policy of economic "reforms" in Ukraine was the formation of very similar to Russia model of semi-peripheral mutations of late capitalism, where the main economic power belongs to clan-oligarchic groups, fused with political power. The specifics of Ukraine, however, is that, unlike our country, there has been no consolidation of this power into a single pyramid headed by the sole leader, but two amorphous space oligarchic groups have formed instead, one of which geo-economically (and therefore politically) tended to Russia, the other – to the EU.

Balancing in such conditions until the time of the "shadow" confrontation of different oligarcho-bureaucratic groups that had no significant differences in socio-economic platforms, but brutally fought for the redistribution of economic power in their favor, "Western" and "Eastern" political and social forces began to "play" with different geopolitical allies and nationalists. For some it proved to be beneficial to flirt with Russia as a geopolitical ally and to position themselves on the territory of Ukraine, using the promotion of Russian standard, profit of cheap gas and other advantages of integration with Russia. For others it was beneficial to promote the idea of national independence of Ukraine, Ukrainian language and European orientation of this country, in contrast to «Asian» Russia.

Behind this, again, was a very serious socio-economic conflicts of identical in their economic-political nature actors associated with the stable (in contrast to short-term political) economic interests of the opposing clan-oligarchic groups. Political power in these conditions, manipulating the population, has positioned itself as the only means to ensure a balance, a compromise between opposing forces.

V. Yanukovych was one of the symbols of such a compromise behavior, and playing "cards" with nationalism was an important component for him. As far as I can judge, basing on the opinion of my knowledgeable comrades^[1], the previous government of Ukraine "flirted" with nationalists and pro-fascist elements, to show who can come to power if they are not elected again. A sort of "semi-pro-Russian" orientation, inconsistent, fluctuating was formed – the government several times changed its decisions about the EU, Russia, remaining each time in the direction of compromise, partly European, partly pro-Russian solutions, constantly tried to appeal to the bugaboo of nationalist threat. As the result, «yanukovychs» themselves strengthened nationalists, creating conditions for their transformation into a real political force.

Unlike the tactics of flirting with the nationalists, the line of suppression of the left has had a consistent character, whoever was at the helm - they were not allowed to power, they were on destructively hit. This concerned, on the one hand, the destruction from the inside of the Socialist party of Ukraine using a wide variety of political technology, while this party tried to portray pro-European social-democratic alternative, with pro-Russian cultural orientation (in the socio-economic and political spheres they were rather the Westerners, as for the cultural – they did not deny Russia and bilingualism). On the other hand, the Communist party of Ukraine has actually driven in the "ghetto" of Russophile orientation, and it became known not only for its socio-economic alternative programs but merely for unequivocal support of V. Putin as the great leader, an alternative to current power and politics in Ukraine.

 The latter has created a rather unpleasant atmosphere. I came face to face with the Ukrainian Marxists, Communists and representatives of left movements, especially in the Eastern part of Ukraine, where Putin was seen as a "salvation" hope. When I tried to explain the economic and political consequences that the residents of Eastern Ukraine will receive as a result of this "salvation," they explained to me that it did not matter, the main thing was they would be allowed to speak Russian.

This inversion of the socio-economic and political struggle was not random and very significant. And meanwhile the socio-economic policy of V. Putin was more right (in the economic sense - more liberal, politically - more authoritarian) than "existing" during the last decades policy of the Yanukovych or his predecessors. They were a little softer, a little more socially oriented in the economic sphere, and this is one of the paradoxes of the Ukrainian situation.

Another important aspect: there was almost no socio-economic differences in policies and programmes of pro-Western and pro-Eastern leading political forces on the eve of the crisis. Behind all of them was the power of the oligarchs, tending to lead to political domination officials, security forces, ideological formations, institutions that will ensure the promotion of their capital and the maximum profit from the exploitation of natural resources and workers of the country. Very symbolic that pro-Russians in  Ukraine were supported until recently by some of the oligarchic clans, associated, typically, with Russian capital, and the new government in Ukraine was supported by the other clans - those for whom closer integration with Western Europe is better, and who seeks to redistribute the Eastern-Ukrainian resources in their favor.

In this sense, it is noteworthy that the new government tried to appoint the Western oligarchs as the leaders of the Eastern regions: it was believed that they will have to give their money to help people in the Eastern part of Ukraine, but in fact they (like Kolomoisky) used their capital to destroy the people of this region.

This is the socio-economic background of the confrontation. It was, as can be seen from the context, about the redistribution of very large, and according to the Ukrainian scale grand - hundreds of billions of dollars -  capital with the possibility of stable profit in the next decades.

In this regard, the clash in Ukraine is a miniature "farcical" copy of a tragic situation in Europe on the eve of the First World war, when the same types of economic system were fighting: in Russia - an authoritarian model of military-feudal imperialism; in Germany, France, England - a bit more "civilized" models but essentially of the same system, only with less legacy of feudalism and with greater development of the capitalism. Differences were not so many, while inside the ENTENTE they were deeper than between the ENTENTE and the Central European block (monarchist Russia with republican France fought against being from a political point of view in the "gap" between them semi-authoritarian Germany, Austria-Hungary and Co). The basis of the confrontation between the two blocks was the similarity of the economic bases - imperialist capital, requiring to "redistribute" economic space. Here you can also add geo-political ambitions of vast bureaucratic state machines, which were then (and still now) fused with the capital.

Let me repeat: something similar, but in the form of a "farce" and on a smaller scale we have today in Ukraine.

 

 

 

 

2. The multidimensionality of contradictions: Ukraine

 

And now, let us recall the dialectical contradictions. In my opinion, they "cut" Ukraine in many ways. The article with emphasis on this multidimensionality of the contradictions I wrote and published on the website of "Alternatives" in December last year (let me remind: there was no such confrontation), specifically noting that the situation can be described only by using a multidimensional model. Then I suggested that the so-called "pro-European" forces will most likely win in the confrontation, and, unfortunately, was not mistaken. But I didn't expect it to go this far. The incident seems to me rather a consequence of the "subjective factor" and a number of evolutionary events, when the quantitative growth of conflicts led to their transformation into a qualitatively new state - civil war. But about this later.

Returning to the contradictions, it is important to clarify, what their multidimensionality means.

Socio-economic stratum, as I have already said, in the original point was characterized by its "Ukrainian cross".

One axis of the opposition was the collision of two identical in nature groups of interest of large oligarchic capital, spliced with relevant state and political forces. Between them, however, there were some differences as well.

Pro-Russian oligarchic capital (historically) was associated mainly with the industrial working class and rural part of Central and Eastern Ukraine, that was besides dominated by the Russian-speaking population. This capital was tied up with the Russian-oriented flows of raw materials, goods and capital.

Pro-Western oligarchs, unlike the first, they were mainly related to the so-called petty bourgeoisie (which can be called "middle class"[2]), and with non-class layer, which is called now precariat[3]. These layers were focused on the EU and, consequently, were involved in the orbit of a pro-Western or "Western-Ukrainian" (by "registration") capital.

So there was a division, partly reminiscent of the situation with the "Bolotnaya" square in Russia.

However, there was another axis of the opposition: on the one hand, oligarchically-bureaucratic, corrupt authorities, from inefficient power of which most citizens in both the West and the East of Ukraine got tired; on the other - the one, until then silent, but under certain conditions, ready to rebel majority. His "mooing", weakly accented politically and ideologically protest was used by the organizers of the Maidan. This protest is aimed at Russia as an [alleged] bearer of main oligarchic evil and semi-artificially created enemy, still feeds some enthusiasm of ordinary supporters of the new Kiev authorities (in this case, I bring outside the brackets the right-wing nationalists and fascists, roots of activity of which should be considered separately). The most paradoxical is that the same in its genesis protest, ultimately, lies in the deepest basis of the resistance of the citizens of the Novorossia.

It requires an important caveat: the author deliberately made above significant reservations: pasting "[supposedly]" and "semi" in the text are not random. The fact is that the peoples of Russia in any case are not enemies of the peoples of Ukraine. Substantial interests of the majority of Russian citizens are opposite not to the interests of the citizens of Ukraine, but to the Russian oligarchs and the government controlled by them. The same can be said about Ukraine. Therefore, let me intentionally repeat, our peoples in any case are not the enemies.

Another thing is the interests of those who have in our countries economic and political power. When our opponents point to the fact that Russia is a country of oligarcho-bureaucratic capitalism, they are telling the truth. But they often "forget" to say that the modern Ukrainian economic and political power has no less pronounced, oligarcho-bureaucratic nature and directly (as opposed to Russian) turns Bandera and Ko (i.e. unambiguous fascists) into heroes (the current disassembly within the ruling clique between Poroshenko, the right sector, etc. has little difference in the essence of the process).

Unlike the peoples of Russia and Ukraine oligarchs and state leaders of our countries have serious questions to each other. In many ways, these questions are linked to the fact that they are similar by nature and equally want to snatch more.

And another important aspect: while the nature of power in our countries is largely similar, there is a big difference in their foreign policy orientation: the government and the oligarchs of Ukraine currently have voluntarily agreed to the role of puppets for (no, not enlightened Europe, but...) military-political bloc NATO headed by the establishment of the USA, while the government and the oligarchs of Russia try to keep at least at some aspects anti-NATO line.

We will focus on the analysis of the latter below, but now let us return to the Ukrainian contradictions.

The multidimensionality of the Ukrainian confrontations, of course, concerned and concerns a socio-political balance of powers as well.

The origins of this confrontation is on the Maidan, where two trends faced each other.

On the one hand, the Maidan, as well as the Bolotnaya, consisted mostly of people seeking a Western (liberal) type of social freedom, i.e. freedom from [bureaucracy, corruption and political manipulation]. This, as you can easily see, is a positive claim of "healthy" bourgeois democracy. They were set forth by different social strata. Among them was precariat in its various forms: from the "eternal" students to creative producers, earning hundreds of times more than "eternal students"; and a significant portion of the "middle class" (a typical example are travel service employers); and some members of the "elite" (especially "glamorous") intelligentsia, who are understandably more focused on the West; and the educational community, etc. All these strata set forth clear antibureaucratic slogans and relied on the silent support of most of the other layers of the workers, tired from weak, inconsistent, corrupted bureaucratic ruling of V. Yanukovych, balansing between pro-Western and pro-Russian oligarchs.

On the other hand, it revealed that these people were not able to "take" power from V. Yanukovych. In order to ensure the change of elites, the real political upheaval was needed that neither Bolotnaya nor Maidan themselves were not and would not be able to do. Not because the bourgeois-democratic revolutionis impossible in principle in our countries, but because here, and in Ukraine the "middle class" is political coward and indecisive.

That is why the coup was not made by masses of predominantly pro-Western intellectuals, that came out in the squares and streets of Kiev, but completely other forces: on the second Maidan (unlike the First[4] and Bolotnaya) people really perturbed by bureaucratic arbitrariness and corruption of the authorities, were used as "masses" by other, staying in the shade for some time, economic and political "actors".

It should be stressed that for the coup organized and decisive, capable of violent actions force was necessary, that addresses objectives of specific economic and political class, supported by a strong financial foundation. Speaking tougher, apart from indignation of the masses, for the coup was necessary a "paid", politically engaged, able to organize and disciplined action group, which seems to express the will of seeking to change the ruling of the ruling clique, but essentially will lead to power a new group of oligarchs and their political representatives. This force should be and was tied to the respective geopolitical allies (in this case - to the West) and, again, was able to correctly use the population that came out in squares requiring a change of government.

Such power turned to be right-nationalistic and pro-fascist groups reared at the forefront by the pro-Western oligarchs, spliced, in their turn, with the establishment of the U.S. and their allies.

Another thing is that playing with fire of fascism brings up to no good: right-wing nationalists and fascists, which seemed to be Poroshenko’s puppets, become more and more dangerous political rivals in the struggle for power, intending to take control of those who imagines themselves puppeteers - current pro-Western Ukrainian politicians. The outcome of this confrontation between right-wing pro-Western liberals and right-wing nationalists it is not yet clear, but in any case it is clear that, firstly, this union has become one of the main reasons for the escalation of conflicts in South-Eastern Ukraine during the Civil war and, secondly, that the naive hopes of "naive" Western liberals about the consistent formation of a democratic, socially-oriented, ideologically pluralistic political system in Ukraine would not materialize.

Thus, we see that most of those who came to the Maidan wanted one thing, and those who got the power as a result has done absolutely other things (the spirit of the former ambassador in Ukraine Chernomyrdin must have played its evil role: "We wanted to make it better, but it has followed the usual way…").

It is worth noting that the previous government had quite reasonable alternatives[5]. However, everything happened “as usual” and no one was in a winning position. In conditions of such political crisis and lack of will organized nationalist groups come to the front. In this regard, in my opinion, the situation became similar to those in the 20-30s of XX century, when the Blackshirts came to power in Italy, the Nazis – in Germany, etc.

These groups did not come to power in Ukraine yet, because they do not have such mass support, as the Nazis in Germany in their time. In modern Ukraine the majority of the population does not support them, and for the oligarchs they are still rather dangerous than useful (at least, as the dominant force; as puppets they are still tried to be used, now and then losing control of "dolls").

But the problem is that currently there is no other force that could systematically implement punitive functions, without which the current Kiev group does not seem to be able to keep power. Real organized structures in Ukraine are nationalist pro-fascist groups and possibly the help of NATO, on the one hand, some groups of pro-Russian citizens, behind which the Russian army is looming in shadow – on the other hand[6].

In this context, contradictions of foreign policy interests of the "players" operating on the Ukrainian field have particular importance.

Let us remind: if we fix multispatiality of contradictions in Ukraine, it becomes obvious that the clear direction of "good" and "evil" are detected with great difficulty. We have a lot of different "evils" that hit with different strength many different social strata, and in these conditions it is difficult (but still necessary) to assess where the most effective (and from whose point of view) solution will be implemented.

So, if we look at foreign policy confrontation, we must admit the efficiency of the classical Marxist analysis, which says that the law is a hostage of socio-economic interests underlying the foreign policy interests. So do not be surprised that the Europeans regarding the situation with Kosovo say one thing and in respect of the Crimea - another, as well as the fact that the Russian authorities had different opinions about the right of the region to self-determination and sovereignty in the first and second cases. The establishment of the West and Russia in both cases did not base on the norms of international law. The latter, as you know, is very fragile and are used, as a rule, to reinforce the position of those who have sufficient economic and political power, by finding the desired article in some international acts proving beneficial for them interpretation thereof via media, PR-pressure and other methods of political and ideological manipulation.

Therefore, the appeal to the norms of international law in the Marxist analysis is possible, but it should always be emphasized that economic and political forces prevailing in the world broke, break and will break them. These rules exist mainly to deter ripening war in case of a conditional equilibrium of economic-political forces to, replacing it temporarily with the "confrontation" in the legal field. That is, until the situation is in more or less stable equilibrium, it is possible to "butt" in the legal field, as various world political forces do. As soon as the situation becomes more complicated and many hundreds of billions of dollars or a similar scale foreign winnings/losses appear at stake, that law gets the second priority; if the amount increases to many trillions – the international law "modestly" shifts in the shade and the world "plays" according to the rules that are on the side of those who have more trillions. Today, the US and its allies have 10 times trillions more than Russia, they are better organized and represented by stronger structures, including NATO. Ergo?...

No, this "game" is not finished yet. Russia managed to win regarding the Crimea, but regarding Ukraine, we will most likely lose strategically. And much.

The most important, however, is not this: actually this is not a game, but a real struggle. Cruel and dangerous. Taking away lives, destroying cities, destroying the culture, inhibiting economic development...

Let us return to our analysis.

As a result of a continuing for nearly a half year civil war, Ukraine found itself in the power of paradoxes that would remind a farce, if a cruel price were not to be paid by residents of once united and peaceful state of Ukraine.

Let us formulate these harsh and cruel contradictions.

Having started the Maidan under the slogans of the pro-European anti-oligarchic democratic revolution, the peoples of Ukraine got a military-bureaucratic regime headed by oligarchs, when all the so-called "European values" are not only violated, but trampled on: in Ukraine all major forms of social support are reduced; the opposition parties are prohibited or under heavy pressure; people who speak out in defense of their civil rights (in the fields of language, political affiliation, etc.) are harassed, beaten or burned alive (as happened, for example, in Odessa); dissent (e.g., sympathy for Russia) are pursued; freedom of speech is violated by outright lies of the official media and cruel censorship... All it could be seen as a consequence of a special situation - the situation of the Civil war, if not "one problem": the causes of this war are directly related to the violation by the Kiev authorities of one of the fundamental democratic rights - the right of peoples to self-determination, the opportunity to determine themselves whether they need chocolate oligarch as the President and the Ukrainian nationalists as his henchmen; the right to decide what language to speak, to work on, to teach, etc. Moreover, let us remind that the initial claims of citizens of the then South-East of Ukraine were very reasonable and absolutely fit the legal field of internationally recognized standards: residents of Donetsk and Lugansk were exclusively for the Federal structure of the Ukrainian state[7] .

They got answer for their demand with artillery, bombing and tanks...

These are the cruel paradoxes of Ukraine.

Not less controversial are positions of other participants of the conflict.

 

3. The multidimensionality of contradictions: the West

 

Of course, the interests of the U.S. and their allies concerning Ukraine are not based on an empty place. They coincide with the interests of a certain part of the capital and some segments of the population of Ukraine. And here the struggle of the last for democracy and other values is part of the genuine position of some of the citizens of the EU and the USA, absolutely legitimate and reasonably appealing to the slogans, with which most of the participants of the Maidan came out (as we remember, these were mostly democratic and positive slogans, while on the second Maidan nationalists and fascists were very strong from the very beginning).

In this sense, attempts to escape from the power of corrupted bureaucrats and oligarchs, to develop democracy, etc. was quite reasonable and noble interest of a number of social groups in Ukraine, and the mass of "ordinary" citizens of the West, sincerely wishing their Ukrainian neighbors to live in a world of values that they share, and which themselves are worthy to be respected. The author also sincerely wishes the peoples of Ukraine to live in an independent, subordinate neither to NATO nor to the Russian authorities, international democratic country with a socially-oriented economy (although strategically of course, I dream of an equal union of democratic socialist Ukraine, Russia and other countries).

But all of these intentions are irrelevant to the essential interests of the West establishment and the real policy of the current government in Ukraine. For them the slogans of democracy, etc. were and are nothing more than camouflage for substantial economic and political proto-imperial interests, although (and it is a paradox I explain, but can't understand) they, these leaders of the EU and the US, subjectively sincerely believe in created by them PR-spoofing. In this sense, the PR-company for the benefit of the Maidan, which was supported by the EU and the US, was in fact nothing more than a political and ideological manipulation. To be more precise – a reversed form, which, as you know, is real, but hides, "turns inside out" the true content.

To illustrate this thesis let us use a fantastic parallel.

Suppose, in November 2013 V. Yanukovych took the decision not in Russia's favor, and in favor of the EU, focusing Ukraine to the EU integration, and in the most decisive way; suppose also that he took the decision to refuse from the use of the Russian language as the second state language in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. Suppose, that in this case, masses of pro-Russian population came to the Maidan and began to storm the government buildings, trade unions buildings, city halls, and V. Yanukovych used "Berkut" for the protection of the pro-European orientation of Ukraine. What would the leaders of the EU and the US do in this case? Would they protect the masses and their intentions for local democracy, or would they support a corrupted autocrat V. Yanukovych, just as they supported Yeltsin in Russia in the autumn of 1993, who has shot with tanks the first democratically elected Parliament of our country?

The question is obviously rhetorical.

So Ukraine confirmed the old truth: the West establishment uses the slogan "protection of democracy" mostly there and then, where and when it suits their political and economic interests. Otherwise, they would say about any dictator just as Roosevelt said of Somoza: "He's a son of a bitch, but he is our son of a bitch".

As an important step aside, let me note: Ukrainian rift made clear a very important rule: establishment of the EU and the US has installed and guards a system of rigid ideological cliches, which must be complied with by any "civilized" actor (politician, intellectual, journalist). If you do not want to become a social outcast, you should repeat the cliché from the "mainstream" (i.e., that authorities in Kiev are the bastion of democracy, volunteers are terrorists, etc.) under the threat of suspension from the "civilized community", with further threat of isolation, loss of job, etc.

For us, people grown up in the era of Brezhnev's stagnation, all of this is painfully familiar: in the era of "socialism", we could express our thoughts not complying with "the general line of the CC of CPSU" too. In the kitchen with no problems. Aloud - with the threat of excommunication from the mainstream with the future loss of employment. The difference is only that in the "Brezhnev" USSR you could be put in mental hospital at worst, and in today's West you will just be "removed", being made a marginal. Just one more example, that is important in the context of this article: if you support the Russian Federation now, you will be treated the same way as the people who spoke in support of Israel in 1970 in the USSR.

But in the essence, the current "democratic" Western model reproduces a model of society based on the hegemony of the ruling nomenclature: all politicians that preserve the hope to occupy a decent place in the elite; party leaders, hoping to become ruling parties; journalists seeking to get (save) a place in the mass media; professors, who do not want to part with the work at leading universities and, more importantly, the "simple" citizens, who do not want to look like "white crows" - all of them need to keep repeating the cliché imposed by the Washington "CC."…

 

4. The multidimensionality of contradictions: Russia

 

As for Russia's position, here we have a less clear situation, and there are several reasons for it. In the position of the Russian authorities, in my opinion, two opposing traits are combined.

On the one hand, it has the same socio-economic interest, as the pro-Western forces – to maintain their control over a significant part of Ukrainian natural resources and industrial enterprises; to profit from the use of this capital in a more or less controversial partnership with the relevant part of the Ukrainian capital; to extend the political influence of the Russian bureaucracy. In addition, the annexation of Crimea has become a powerful geopolitical prize for the Russian government, immeasurably raised the rating of the ruling politicians in the country. In addition, the wave of the Russian Imperial chauvinism raised by this successes really strengthened the authoritarian union of oligarchs and bureaucracy.

These changes were largely the result of a new trend in the interests of the Russian oligarchs. As rightly noted A.I. Kolganov, Russian transnational companies, having become strong and having taken part in struggle on world markets, immediately faced with the weakness of the international status of their "native" state, unable to protect actively enough (as the USA, EU or China) and advance their expansionist ambitions in the world markets. The reaction of oligarchs did not made long to wait: a powerful order to strengthen the foreign policy intentions of Russia appeared and, as a consequence, the strengthening of the military-industrial complex. The latter was even more important because, as you know, this is followed by significant orders of the budget, generating considerable profit for "grown up" and wanting to get their piece of the pie Russian industrial corporations.

All this is largely a reactionary tendency.

Not less reactionary trend is strengthening of political authoritarianism. Bugaboo of "maidanization" is constantly played with by the Russian authorities as a pretext for strengthening the "vertical of power": if there is no strong power of the President and Co, there will be chaos, the fascist power and the civil war. This rhetoric is even more effective, because it rests on the wave of sincere patriotism really emerging and growing in different circles of Russian society.

This also applies to a blatantly contradictory position of the Russian authorities concerning the right of peoples to self-determination: if the peoples of the Crimea or Novorossia want to secede from Ukraine - it is their legitimate democratic right. If the same wants some peoples in Russia or someone begins at least to offer it, then it will be... a criminal offence.

On the other hand, in the conflict of Russia with the West establishment, there is a progressive side.

Firstly, in the situation in Crimea for the first time in the last 25 years there is a precedent when a national state won in confrontation with the forces of global protoimperia: Russia showed the world that the US, NATO and Co can be successfully dealt with.

This raises a difficult theoretical and important in practical terms question of whether Russia's actions in this conflict is an imperialist expansion? The answer to this question stucks in the other: whether a modern Russia is an empire? Long before the current international confrontations A.I. Kolganov and I wrote that in Russia an oligarcho-bureaucratic mutation of late capitalism of [semi]peripheral type is formed. And this thesis did not face any particular criticism of the current whistleblowers of Russian imperialism. The author still believes that this assessment of the nature of the Russian social system is fair. Therefore, all those who consider Russia an empire in fact follow the tastes of the Russian imperials’ propaganda, stating the desired (by them) to be real.

This, of course, does not imply that the Russian economic and political authorities do not have expansionist ambitions. They do. But they are not the ambitions of the empire. They are ambitions of a semi-peripheral not-empire to win a part of space for their capital, the space being divided between the proto-empires of the center. Is this the expansionism of Russia progressive? In and of itself - not more than the intention of Argentina in the war with Great Britain over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). It is a "normal" desire of a small capitalist predator to snatch a piece from a large one. And if this interest bears some positive things, they are only in the sense that it at least partially restricts the appetites of these empires. This is the case in the confrontation between Russia and the West in the current Ukrainian conflict. It is no more (but no less as well) than Russia's attempt to oust partly the imperial aspirations of the global capital "center". With this capital the Russian capital and representing its bureaucracy had a conflict. The current Kiev authorities in this case was the only mediator in this conflict, and its victims are the peoples of Ukraine and Russia, and - primarily - Novorossia.

Another paradox of all this is that this confrontation of different capitals roused the patriotism of the peoples, which (and this is a tragic side of the paradox) was in some cases directed against their own friends: the Ukrainians against the Russians, the Russians - not only against the West (the peoples of which, by the way, are guilty of the actions of obamas and Co not more than the Russians were to blame for the actions of yeltsins and Co), but against (which is a crime) of the peoples of Ukraine as well.

Secondly, a truly heroic (with all its contradictions, listed below) struggle of the citizens of the Novorossia for their hearthes stirred in Russia a wave not only of chauvinism (what we should never forget), but also of true patriotism. For the first time in recent decades, the youth and the older generation, working people and "ordinary" intellectuals most sincerely and seriously took the interests of the "far" - the residents of Donetsk and Lugansk regions, as well as the interests of our mother country as their own, making the step on the other side of only egoistic interest of a market agent, consumer, private owner.

There is one more point: the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine was actually suppressed by the present Kiev authorities, taking undemocratic measures (up to bans on Russian-speaking television). As a result, we got a situation when the Russian-speaking population was in a weak position, the one who needs protection.

And this is not the case when bandits send a small guy to shoot a cigarette from a passer-by, and then rob him, supposedly protecting a "small" guy from resentment.

In the case of the Novorossia there is a real need for protection of this large group of the population and development mechanisms of democracy for it: local authorities, federalism, etc. (this sometimes happens in imperial conflicts, though rarely). And the subject, setting forth these requirements, became initially the citizens of these regions and that referenda showed (that the majority of citizens really supported the self-determination is recognized by even such skeptics as Ilya Ponomarev).

So contradictory intertwined interests of the Russian bureaucracy and oligarchs, on the one hand, the majority of citizens of Russia and part of the citizens of Ukraine - on the other.

Another thing is that I am sure: the Russian government in a new space will be no better than in Russia itself. In the same Crimea, to my deep regret, probably in six months or a year will be the same authority bureaucrats and oligarchs, implementing in practice the philosophy of "drank-rollback", as in the rest of Russia....

As a result, the situation is extremely contradictory in confrontations Russia-Ukraine-West.

In the case of Ukraine questions about the results of the Maidan and following it political upheaval are still open. If the power remains with current cliques or their direct descendants, socially-oriented democratic transformations really necessary for Ukraine will be implemented only in documents. In fact, a pro-Western mutation of oligarchic-bureaucratic capitalism of peripheral type with inevitably inherent nationalism, authoritarianism and over-exploitation of the country by oligarchic capital and parasitic state apparatus will strengthen.

After coming to power in such Ukraine European capital is unlikely to differ positively from the former, partly pro-Russian. Hopes of many sincere supporters of the Maidan that new Ukraine will characterized by larger social protection, larger employers' rights, real democracy and freedom of speech, protection of social and civil rights of the Individual, flowering of national cultures, etc. as I has already written, prove groundless.

Two reservations are important here.

First. If we compare how the capital dominates in Western Europe and how it does the same in Russia, the choice is clearly in favor of the first. But here is the "trick": a pro-European capital in the periphery behaves not so democratic and civilized, as in Europe, and is little different from Russian or pro-Russian. And although in the past in some aspects European corporations in Ukraine there were still a few more "civilized" than the representatives of Russian capital (not accidentally in Ukraine independent trade unions rather tended to Maidan), after the civil war, the situation will most likely change for the worse. Moreover, it has already changed for the worse during the spring and summer of 2014.

Second. Foreign policy interests of the Russian side also have some of nuances. In Ukraine a Russian component is often associated with the Soviet one. For Western Ukraine it has a rather negative connotation. For the East - on the contrary. In the Crimea, indeed, for many of inhabitants a return to Russia is associated with the restoration of the elements of the USSR[8]. This should be taken into consideration, but it is, unfortunately, the same perverse form, as in the case of the belief that the EU will bring a democracy to Ukraine. Russia will not bring traits of the USSR in the Crimea, but the power of clan-oligarchic groups instead, what is typical for other regions of our country.

In addition, as I have already said, there is a problem of protection of Russian-speaking population that is a minority now, and in this sense, the interests of Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russians are on the side of real democracy.

And the last thesis. Analytical separation of multispatiality of contradictions does not excuse the author from taking a certain position in the current confrontation and reply, on whose side Buzgalin is.

Let me start with a few firm "no".

Let's start with the Russian authorities. I remain a critic of Russian capitalism of Jurassic period and, accordingly, the internal policy of the Russian authorities. I was against Russia's war in Chechnya and will be against any infringement of the right of peoples to self-determination, if any is made by the Russian authorities. I was not against the support of the Crimea citizens’ wish to join Russia. Abstractly speaking, it is preferable in all senses to save a status of an independent state for the Crimea. In all respects except one: in this case, Kiev authorities would have started a war against the opposition, turning a fabulous land in ruins, with a very high probability. Apparently, the Crimea citizens understood it and voted on a referendum for joining Russia.

As for Ukraine, I was and remain a supporter of the right of peoples to replace oligarcho-bureaucratic corrupted authorities by methods of direct democracy and in this sense I consider legitimate basic anti-bureaucratic and anti-oligarchic intentions of ordinary participants of the Maidan. But I consider the usurpation of this struggle by right-liberal and right-nationalist leaders as a crime. I consider the mass murder of the residents of Donetsk and Lugansk regions unleashed by these authorities as a terrible crime.

The question about the author's attitude to Novorossia requires special treatment, and we are moving to it now.

And now maybe the most important thing: in spring-summer 2014 all these issues got tied in a very tight knot in Donetsk and Lugansk regions. The civil war did an objectivist, heartless, stepping aside from defining the positions political analysis immoral, however, largely increased the need to keep cold mind and objectivity of investigation.

 

5. Novorossia: peoples’ uprise or a product of imperialist ambitions of the Russian capital?

 

Let me repeat: life and death of thousands of people force you to be defined. And the author wants to express his position: the struggle of the Novorossia citizens, with all its monstrous contradictions and negative mass, is a just case. Aggression of Kiev authorities is a criminal matter. And the main thing here is not about legitimate or not from the point of view of certain norms of international law the actions of volunteers are. The question is: whether these actions are progressive or not, moral or not, whether they meet the fundamental interests of the inhabitants of these regions or not? I answer the last question: "Yes." And those who say that in the case of humility with Kiev authorities everything would be less bloody, in my opinion, look like the burghers, who sought to "wait out" the fascist or imperialist aggression. The lessons of Buchenwald and Indian civilization shows with all obviousness, what happens to those who are "waiting".

Above said, however, does not excuse us from objective analysis of the real contradictions of this Civil war and, above all, the contradictions of Novorossia itself.

Contrary to the canons of the marxist analysis it seems rational in this case to begin with political and ideological and even cultural questions, for they became the main basis for the escalation of the conflict and its transformation into the war. And here the situation is extremely difficult.

On the one hand, slogans and political statements of many of Novorossia leaders (and particularly often - in the comments of their Russian followers) contain Russian imperial expansionism. In some cases, it becomes directly supportive of the great Russian chauvinism up to the dreams of Russian tanks in Lvov and open hatred of all Ukrainian, and statements about the alleged artificial nature of the Ukrainian state. I can understand such rhetoric of some citizens of Novorossiysk, whose children were killed by Ukrainian shells or bombs, but you cannot justify even them. It is impossible, as even in such a tragedy as the Great Patriotic war, hatred of the Soviet people for the fascist invaders and Hitler did not become the slogans of the struggle with the German nation, culture and statehood. Moreover, it is absolutely unfair in respect of friendly peoples of Ukraine[9].

Returning to Novorossia, we should definitely say that the abovementioned imperial ambitions are not the official program of this neoplasm. And, not all leaders support them, saying nothing about rank activists-fighters, among which there are many supporters of soviet ideas.

Moreover, pro-Russian sentiments have another side, and it is crucial: actually, in the essence, the struggle of volunteers became the protection of vital interests of citizens from aggressors, who led a campaign of mass extermination of the population of their allegedly own country.

Speaking the language of the law, the people of Novorossia realized their right to revolt (if I'm not mistaken, even the United States Declaration of Independence proclaims this right people if the government is pursuing anti-people policy).

Speaking the language of morality, this struggle is protection of the Good - lives of women, children and elderly people, houses and schools...

Yes, this struggle is being waged by people who are very far from the ideals of human rights defenders and their methods are not parliamentary at all. But, as practice shows, superdemocratical West, pursuing its interests, can destroy in the fire of nuclear bombing hundreds of thousands civilians of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; or - by using carpet bombing and napalm - millions of Vietnamese. And our so loving to talk about "human rights" intellectuals, with very few exceptions - real human rights protectors heroes – were screaming "kill the vermin!" at the defenders of the Council House, and if hard times come, they will not be able to defend from an aggressor even their children, saying nothing for the Homeland. In In practice, absolutely different people usually protect both children, and women (even other’s), and their Homeland. Including those who tend to imperial symbols, love discipline and order more than democratic values. But these people are ready to give their lives for other people, for their right to live, to have a home and a school, and our "democrats", as a rule, are ready in the best case - to emigrate, in the worst – to hold a stone in the pocket.

That is a real dialectic of Novorossia, where mainly statesmen and Russian nationalists have become real defenders of human rights.

However, another important counterpoint: projects of Novorossia clearly and explicitly mention as a priority elections to the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of representatives of labor collectives for the formation of a truly democratic government immediately after the war. This project emphasizes the need to preserve the Ukrainian language as the state language. The latter, by the way, is particularly symbolically distinguishes these "statists" from Kiev "democrats" refusing the Russian language in a status of a state one.

A few words about the economy. Unlike oligarchs who came to supreme power in modern Ukraine, Novorossia does not receive support from any oligarch from Donetsk or Lugansk. All so-called "pro-Russian" East oligarchs ultimately turned out to be on the side of Kiev, as in the struggle of Donetsk and Lugansk for their power they rightly saw a greater threat for themselves than in competition from Western brothers-in-class.

Another very important question - what the real socio-economic and political-ideological system will develop in Novorossia in case of its victory in the war and formation of an independent state? This question is still open [10].

Judging by the ideologies of Novorossia military officers and shamelessly idealizing Russia proclamations in a number of DPR and LPR documents, the "capitalism of the Jurassic period" will be formed on these territories, but in his other subtype: more paternalistic, more nationalistic and less liberal both in economic and political sense.

Judging by the official statements of civilian leaders and the draft programme of Novorossia, the social system, that they want to create, will be quite different from Russian capitalism mutations. It will be more social, less oligarchic, more focused on the basic human values (education, health, housing) and paternalistic, but also less liberal both in economic and political sense.

Which one of these two alternatives will be implemented and whether it will implemented – this question, let me repeat, remains open. And we - scientists, experts, activists of democratic left spectrum - cannot remain away from the battle, declaring in skeptical-arrogant style "a Plague on both your houses!"

But about slogans of the left we will speak at the end of the article.

Now let us put the last in this section question: whether there is an impulse of Russian expansionism in the armed struggle of Novorossia? In my opinion - yes. But this impulse is again contradictory.

Yes, the Russian oligarchies-bureaucratic state has an interest to express itself in Ukraine, showing the US and the EU that it has some power to protect their economic and political interests. This is an impulse of a "small" peripheral capitalist, trying to press a few an "older brother". Most likely, there would be few results on foreign political and foreign economic scene in the beginning (the real strengthening of the economic union of the BRICS countries – is a long-term perspective), although some positive changes in domestic macroeconomic policy may occur (support of domestic producers and so on) and some negative changes in the internal political life (continuation of the policy of curtailing real democracy, rise of nationalism and so on).

Thus it is essential that this peripheral expansionism of Russia, first of all, is extremely inconsistent in general and in relation to Novorossia in particular. Russian authorities and the capital behind it rightly fear trends of real grassroots self-organization and initiative, real antioligarchism present in this struggle of defending itself world along with the pro-Russian rhetoric.

Secondly, Russian expansionism (as any "normal" capitalist expansionism) "splashes a child with dirty water": having reasonably started the fight against the hegemony of Western capital, our economic and political authority by its most zealous imperial ideologists moved to openly reactionary criticism of the real achievements of democracy, education, culture of Europe and especially the United States, spreading in many cases, the ideological imperatives of clericalism, monarchism, and - what is especially dangerous - the great-Russian chauvinism and Russian nationalism.

Meanwhile, here is another counterpoint - the Russian authorities, thirdly, objectively act as one of the very few opponents of the hegemony of global capital tending to imperial absolutism. Thus in the field of world policy the Russian authorities in some cases become a progressive force, limiting the hegemony of the USA and Co, and able to contribute to the beginning of consolidation of anti-hegemonic forces of the world. In case of success of these projects quite reactionary states (Russia for example) would become such anti-hegemonic actors – one more paradox! Their anti-hegemonism will be half-hearted, selfish, contradictory and inconsistent, very far from the ideals of alterglobalisation[11], but... "that has grown - has grown"…

And also: along with the imperialist ambitions of the Russian capital and state in our country there is a friendly and sincere impulse of ordinary citizens seeking to help even not their fellow citizens, but in fact absolutely strange people - volunteers and refugees from Novorossia. This is the most important positive result of the current tragedy. It is especially important as this impulse is an impulse of volunteer struggle for justice in a foreign country, the impulse that inherits the best traditions of the internationalists in Spain in 1936-37, and it is becoming increasingly international: today among the volunteers there are people from dozens of different countries of Europe and Asia. And this is another evidence in favor of Novorossia and against the Kiev authorities, on the side of which there are mercenaries from private armies...

 

*      *      *

 

Concluding my analysis, I would like to put almost the most difficult question: what might be the positive slogans of the left on these issues?

It is fundamentally difficult to highlight them and the shown above multidimensionality of contradictions is «guilty». But there are obvious tasks.

Firstly: to stop the war and to recognize the right of citizens of Donetsk and Lugansk regions to decide their fate themselves.

Secondly: we must oppose the fascist and armed nationalist groups, insist on their disarmament and dissolution under the control of the institutions of civil society. There should be a strict prohibition of fascist ideology, symbols, etc. It concerns Ukraine (by the way, following European values Ukraine ought to repent and ask the world - and especially the Jews, Russians, Poles, etc. - forgiveness for the atrocities and crimes of Bandera and Co the way it was done, for example, by Germany, that repented for the crimes of the national socialists). It concerns Russia. It also concerns Novorossia (to the extent that there will manifest itself something similar to Russian fascists).

We understand that in the real war a slogan of antifascism as right as unproductive. But we should nominate it anyway. At least, to show that we will be against right-wing Russian nationalists (and especially Russian fascists) on the whole territory of Russia, including the Crimea.

The third task: for all of us it is very important to emphasize socio-economic and political aspects and goals, i.e. to speak not only about the geopolitical interests of Russia, the EU and the USA, Ukraine, Novorossia, etc. but also about economic and social regime in these countries, stressing the importance of the struggle for grassroots democracy, civil and socio-economic rights, etc.

This concerns, let us emphasize again, Ukraine, Russia, and, in particular, the Crimea, and especially Novorossia, where there is hope for forms of economic and political life more progressive than in Russia and where it is at least worth fighting for.

And the last one. I have repeatedly stressed that Russian fascism cannot be an alternative to Ukrainian fascism and Russian chauvinism – to Ukrainian nationalism. We must speak for democratic government, internationalist-oriented line in Russia, in Ukraine, and Novorossia.

We need to demand "reformatting" of slogans constantly.

This, again, seems utopian, but in some cases such utopian slogans are important. So, in the autumn of 1914, the bolsheviks were among the very few left who advocated the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war. This slogan was rejected then by almost everybody including the european social democrats. But three years later after a senseless bloodbath an idea of fraternization and change of the "type" of the struggle has found many supporters, and in 1917-1918 revolutions occurred in Russia and in Germany. The bolsheviks, unlike other Russian and German patriots, were strategically right. So now seemingly utopian but strategically correct slogans are necessary and relevant, even when they have the support of the minority.

 

PS. The main struggle for the future of PRD and PRL is yet to come

 

And now the most important. The summer 2014 has already shown: the most difficult problems of PRD and PRL would be decided not on the fronts. It doesn't reduce the price of the armed struggle, but the most difficult will be the choice of the future.

What will a neoplasm, which now the citizens of Donetsk and Lugansk regions (not all by the way) call the PRD and PRL or Novorossia, grow in?

While among the leaders of the PRD and the PRL prevails a nostalgia for the Russian Empire and statism illusions, alongside with the belief in the 'good tsar' (Russian?). All this is complemented by an absolutely understandable (during all these months of the war only Russia somehow helps the PRD and the PRL), but totally unjustified idealization of modern Russian socio-economic and political-ideological systems (unjustified, because during the last decades the real power in Russia belongs to essentially the same as Ukrainian oligarho-bureaucratic nomenclature).

All this can lead to sad results, namely, the situation can resolve in Chernomyrdin’s way – «as always». However, given the reality of patriotism and enthusiasm of rank fighters and commanders of the volunteers, and of all those who sacrificed themselves, rescuing civilians and helping all of them to survive together in the hell perpetuated by Kiev authorities, - taking this into account, there is still a possibility to struggle for a different trend.

To the extent that the struggle for new Novorossia's future remains a real possibility, I'm sure, the main issue, which soon will be faced by each volunteer, by each resistance activist of Donetsk and Lugansk, will be the task of a conscious political and ideological choice.

You, comrades, will have to consciously, deliberately choose the model of your future. And, remember while choosing: you will not have a good Russian Tsar, because it has never existed, does not exist, and will not exist in Russia. 'The tsars' are not 'good', by definition. They serve those who has led them to power. And those are not valiant officers whose highest valour is to guard the state, but those, in whose hands is a key economic and political power. Today in Russia those are one or two hundreds of dollar billionaires, for which at the moment it is beneficial not only to sell gas and oil but preying on military expenditures of the state.

So ephemeral are the hopes that the honest fighters having left the «dirty» politics, can be changed by a group of «professionals». The latter will lead to power all the same yanukovichs, poroshenkos and co.

There is only one alternative: only you will be able to choose the correct path actively engaging in social and political life, in the government of your future republic. Or make a mistake and lose all what thousands of your comrades and civilians have given their lives for. Responsibility for the future of the PRD and the PRL is on you. The front does not end with the victory in the war. That is why even the most distinguished soldiers and workers do not have the moral right to say tomorrow (or today): politics is dirty and not mine ... After this phrase new corrupted politicians will sit on your neck, and they will give the power you struggled for to new oligarchs and corrupted officials.

Don't give the Motherland you conquered neither yours nor Russian politicians! Struggle for your own power. And, I must say honestly, this struggle will not be easier than the war with the Kiev authorities.